

7 September 1960

## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

I. [redacted] enable us to reconstruct a good deal of what has gone on between Moscow and Peiping since the Soviets called the Chinese to account at the Bucharest meeting in June.

A. For more than two years Soviet and Chinese parties had been publicly quarreling about fundamental issues in world Communist strategy.

1. Whether Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence" and detente should be replaced by more militant revolutionary policy, especially in underdeveloped areas,
2. Whether bloc should seek to avoid local wars (Soviet view) or instead should support and even incite "liberation" and other "just" wars (Chinese view).
3. Whether disarmament should be seriously negotiated with West (Moscow seems to say yes, Peiping clearly says no).
4. Whether Communist parties can often take power in non-Communist countries without armed struggle. (Soviets contend this is possible).
5. Whether Communist parties in non-Bloc countries should press "minimum" or "maximum" program, and to what degree they should cooperate with non-Communists. (Soviets in most cases favor "minimum" program with close cooperation.)

B. After Chinese party had exerted disruptive influence at WFTU meeting in June, Soviet party went on offensive at Bucharest with 84-page letter distributed to all Communist parties [redacted]

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1. It reaffirmed Soviet positions in above-listed disputes, rebuked Chinese for "disloyal and uncomradely" behavior, closed with implicit warning that Chinese failure to "draw necessary conclusions" would result in reduction or withdrawal of Soviet aid.

2. Khrushchev followed this letter with bitter speech.

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[redacted] Chinese party, about a week after close of Bucharest meeting--i.e., in early July--sent harsh letter to Soviet party.

- A. Chinese letter rejected all the charges made by the Soviets at Bucharest.
- B. Letter also stated Chinese grievance over Soviet failure to support Chinese fully in policies toward Taiwan.
- C. Most importantly, in response to implicit Soviet threat at Bucharest, Chinese letter warned that, unless Soviet party backed down, China would expel Soviet technicians and would publicly renounce "all Soviet economic aid."

III. This letter apparently made Soviet party furious.

- A. Soviet party shot back a letter reaffirming its positions and stating its refusal to be dictated to by its junior.
- B. Soviet Home Service began to prepare Russian people for possible break, by ceasing comment on Chinese affairs.

IV. Soviet party central committee held plenum in mid-July.

- A. Plenum resolution made serious charges that Chinese--not yet named--were guilty of "leftwing sectarian deviation" and "narrow nationalism."

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B. These charges were similar to--but not as strong as--Cominform resolution of June 1948 which expelled Yugoslav party.

V. Shortly after the Soviet party plenum, some part of the Soviet technicians in China began to leave.

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A. We do not know extent of withdrawal.

- B. We also do not know who took the initiative--that is, who first moved from threats to action.
- C. Concurrently with this withdrawal, and just after a secret meeting of Chinese party leaders in Shanghai, Shanghai journal published emotional article emphasizing advisability of relying on "one's own efforts."
1. Observed that "reactionaries in some countries...are trying to isolate us," are refusing "to let us progress to become rich and powerful."
  2. Said "we have a belly-full of anger," must use this anger for strength.
- D. Similar emotional passages in mid-August article by CCP Politburo member. Denouncing imperialists and "those who echo them," article declared their "anti-Chinese activity" simply proved that "we are real Marxist-Leninists." Also said those trying to "isolate" us will just isolate themselves.

[REDACTED]

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1. Article discussed new policy of giving greater attention to development of agriculture--which reflected concern over food shortages, but also, perhaps, expectation of reduced Soviet aid to industry.

- VI. During Bucharest meeting, Soviet party arranged to have another Bloc conclave in Moscow in November, at which Communist parties were to try to resolve the Sino-Soviet dispute.
- A. In preparation for November meeting, Soviets have in fact moved to isolate Chinese party in world Communist movement.
  - B. During August, several harsh attacks on Chinese policies and actions in Soviet media.
    1. These charge Chinese with "blasphemy," with drawing "absurd" conclusions from current world situation, with departing from and failing to understand Marxism.
    2. Also charge Chinese implicitly with "disorganizing" and "disorienting" other Communist parties--evidently preparation for Soviet charge at some future bloc meeting that Chinese are "splitting" world Communist movement.
  - C. Also in August, Moscow sent further letters to all parties stating its case against Peiping.

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- [REDACTED]
1. Letter contains a formal and sober appraisal of admitted "sharp and strong" differences with Peiping.
  2. Letter reaffirms the Soviet positions taken at Bucharest.

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3. Letter said Sino-Soviet differences should not be "publicly fanned," as this only helps the West. Said would try again to resolve differences at November meeting.

VII. Between now and November, Chinese will be able to judge that they will not get much support from other parties, and Peiping will also be under heavy Soviet pressure.

A. These developments may induce Peiping to back down--to extent of refraining from publicly shouting its disagreements with Moscow and from lobbying among other bloc parties.

B. Might agree at Moscow to sign another innocuous communique, as at Bucharest.

VIII. However, any such "reconciliation" would be merely nominal.

A. We see little prospect that the dispute can be resolved under the present leaderships of the Soviet and Chinese parties. The issues are too fundamental, and the leaders have too heavily committed their prestige against each other.

IX. In any case, next move is up to Peiping.

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